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Abstract
This paper applies the idea of forward induction to a classical economic
problem: the existence of an eﬃcient form of competition in the case of
increasing returns to scale. It proves that, properly formalized, this idea
leads to average cost pricing as the horizon goes to inﬁnity.
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Introduction

In the recent literature on Nash reﬁnements, the notion of forward induction
appears as an attractive but rather elusive idea (Kohlberg, 1989). As compared
to solution concepts based on credible threats, such as perfect equilibria (Selten,
1975), forward induction seems closer to the original idea of self-enforceability
(Nash, 1951) since the very notion of threat requires some form of commitment
which here seems eliminated.
This whole issue of self-enforceability and commitment is a major one as soon
as the subgames have multiple perfect equilibria. Perfection does not impose
any further rationality constraint and this implicitly means that the players can
jointly commit themselves to any subgame perfect equilibrium. Some of these
commitments may appear irrational.
One way to deal with this issue is to introduce the idea of renegotiation
proofness (Maskin and Moore, 1988) : a joint commitment out of the equilibrium
path should punish the deviating player without hurting the punishing one. Yet
this also involves a form of joint commitment on the kind of subgame perfect
equilibria that can be used as credible threats.
∗ This paper beneﬁted from insightful comments from C. d’Aspremont, G. Demange, L.A.
Gérard-Varet, J.F. Mertens, and E. Van Damme and from an anonymous referee. The idea
to work on entry games comes from a discussion with C. Henry on various ways to model
potential competition.
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Forward induction approaches this issue from a diﬀerent angle. Informally
stated it says that once selected, a path should be immune to any deviation
that could be interpreted as a valid signal. A valid signal is such that it determines without ambiguity a more proﬁtable path to the deviating player in the
remaining part of the game, this path being itself immune to a further signal.
Intuitively the idea of forward induction does not seem to require any form of
commitment out of the selected path. Thus it seems closer to self-enforceability.
However, forward induction is elusive, that is, diﬃcult to formalize. Van
Damme (1989) provides a number of stimulating examples but his approach
remains quite open. Still he suggests that the deﬁnition of Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986) is too restrictive to capture the full potential of the original idea.
The major trend of research on forward induction concentrates on signalling
games and reﬁnements of sequential equilibria (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). It
tries to remain as general as possible. There is another direction that can be
pursued to formalize forward induction. It is related to the notion of focal points
(Shelling, 1960) which builds on the singularities of a game. For an exploratory
discussion of this idea see Ponssard (1990). This paper provides a complete
illustration of the approach. It deﬁnes a class of games and the associated formalization of forward induction. The formalization relies on general rationality
properties, the power of which largely depends on the class of games under
consideration.
The class of games to be studied consists of ﬁnite repetition of a two player
simultaneous move game with complete information. The game models the
problem of entry in a market large enough to support only one ﬁrm, given the
ﬁxed cost involved. In this framework it is proved that an appropriate formalization of forward induction leads to intense potential competition in the
sense that the incumbent price converges to average cost pricing as the number
of repetition increases. This result favorably compares with a perfect equilibrium approach or a renegotiation proofness approach in which any individually
rational outcome could be obtained.
Section 2 discusses the formalization of forward induction that will be used
throughout the paper. Section 3 introduces the economic model and gives the
result and the corresponding proof. Section 4 discusses the relevance of the
approach.

2

A Formalization of Forward Induction For a
Class of Repeated Games

As already mentioned, the notion of forward induction is diﬃcult to formalize.
No attempt is made here to propose a formalization that could be applied to
any game in extensive form.
Instead, a three-step approach is used: ﬁrst deﬁne a class of games in extensive form, then deﬁne forward induction and apply it to the class of games under
study, ﬁnally discuss whether or not the proposed formalization involves ad hoc
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ingredients which invalidate the claim that the notion of forward induction is
enough to obtain the result. The third step is kept until the last section.
The class of games under study (Γ) takes the form of ﬁnite repetitions (Gn )
of a constituent game (G). Moreover, the constituent game is characterized as
follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (The constituent game G).
(i) Only two-player simultaneous move games of complete information are considered;
(ii) players are restricted to only play pure strategies.
This precisely deﬁnes the class of games Γ. For any Gn ∈ Γ, Gn , is the n-times
repetition of G. Let p ∈ P and q ∈ Q be the moves in G of player 1 and player
2, respectively. A path in Gn , is denoted as
(Pn , Qn ) = ((pn , qn ), (pn−1 , qn−1 ), ...., (pn , q1 )) = ((p1 , qn ), (Pn−1 , Qn−1 )).
Observe that 1 is the last period. Denote by π1 (Pn , Qn ) and π2 (Pn , Qn ) the
players’ respective payoﬀs in Gn associated with a path (Pn , Qn ).
The proposed solution concept associates to any game Gn a set of paths Sn .
Any path (Pn , Qn ) = ((pn , qn ), (Pn−1 , Qn−1 )) in Sn satisﬁes three conditions: perfection, backward induction, and forward induction.
Condition 1 (Perfection). (Pn , Qn ) is a perfect Nash equilibrium path of Gn
(in the simple sense of subgame perfection).
Condition 2 (Backward induction). If (Pn , Qn ) ∈ Sn , then (Pn−1 , Qn−1 ) ∈
Sn−1 .
The third condition relies on a form of independence with respect to irrelevant alternatives. It is the key element of the formalization and requires several
deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2 (Restriction of G). G∗ is said to be a restriction of G if P is
restricted to some P ∗ ⊂ P (or Q is restricted to some Q∗ ⊂ Q).
Deﬁnition 3 (Ambiguity of a restriction of G). Consider a restriction G∗
of G. If iterated elimination of weakly dominated moves in G∗ yields a unique
payoﬀ outcome independent of the order of elimination, G∗ is not ambiguous.
Otherwise it is ambiguous.
Deﬁnition 4 (Sunk cost). Consider a path (Pn , Qn ) = ((pn , qn ), (Pn−1 , Qn−1 )).
An initial move pcn = pn is said to involve a sunk cost for player 1 (and similarly
qnc = qn for player 2) if and only if the payoﬀs in G associated with (pn , qn ) and
(pcn , qn ) are diﬀerent for player 1. This diﬀerence, which may be positive or
negative, is called a sunk cost and is denoted c1 (pn , pcn ).
By deﬁnition
c1 (pn , pcn ) = 0 .
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Deﬁnition 5 (Admissible paths in Gn−1 after a sunk cost). Assume
the deviating player is player 1. Let π1 (Pn , Qn ) be player 1’s payoﬀ in Gn and

c1 (pn , pcn ) be the sunk cost generated by the deviation pcn . A path (Pn−1
, Qn−1 ) in
c


Gn−1 is admissible if and only if c1 (pn , pn ) < π1 (Pn−1 , Qn−1 )−π1 (Pn−1 , Qn−1 ).
∗
Deﬁnition 6 (Almost equivalent paths). A subset of paths Sn−1
of Sn−1
in the game Gn−1 are said to be almost equivalent if and only if they only diﬀer


∗
, Qn−1 ) and (Pn−1
, Qn−1 ) in Sn−1
and for
at some stage k, that is, for all (Pn−1




all m, 1  m  n − 1 and m = k : (pm , qm ) = (pm , qm ).

Deﬁnition 7 (Ambiguity of an admissible set of paths). Assume the
∗
deviating player is player 1. Let Sn−1
be the admissible set of paths in Gn−1
∗
for a given path (Pn , Qn ) and a deviation pcn involving a sunk cost. Sn−1
is not
ambiguous if and only if one of the following two statements holds:
∗
consists of a unique path;
(i) Sn−1
∗
consists of almost equivalent paths and if G∗ is the restricted game in
(ii) Sn−1
∗
for the stage
which player 1’s moves are restricted to belong to the paths of Sn−1
∗
k at which these almost equivalent paths may diﬀer, G is not ambiguous.
∗
is ambiguous.
Otherwise Sn−1
Condition 3 (Forward induction). If a path is in Sn then, whatever an
initial deviation involving a sunk cost, one of the following two statements holds:
(i) there is no path in Sn−1 that is admissible,
∗
of all admissible paths which belong to Sn−1 is ambiguous.
(ii) the subset Sn−1
This formalization of forward induction is consistent with Van Damme’s
original idea based on uniqueness and viability (Van Damme, 1989). Namely,
∗
if Sn−1
contains only one path it is not ambiguous; this refers to uniqueness.
Then, combining Conditions 2 and 3 implies that Condition 3 has to be satisﬁed
at all stages; this refers to viability.
The proposed formalization does not require much in terms of rationality.
The stringent constraint is to admit that a deviation may commit the deviating
player in the future but this form of commitment is strictly limited by the
deﬁnition of ambiguity.
Here is a simple example that illustrates the deﬁnition. Let G be



α

a
(0, 4)
b  (1, 0)
c
(3, 1)

β
(1, 5)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)

γ


(1, 3)
(1, 3) 
(0, 0)

Recall that the players are restricted to pure strategies:
(i) For G1 , it is clear that any Nash equilibrium meets Conditions
1, 2, and 3. Thus,
S1 = {(c, α); (a, β); (b, γ)}
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(ii) For G2 , observe that any combination of one stage equilibria
generates a perfect equilibrium path.
Consider a path such as ((a, β); (a, β)).
Player 1’s total payoﬀ is 2, a deviation from a to b generates a sunk cost of 1,
and there is a unique sub-equilibrium in G1 that makes this deviation proﬁtable,
namely (c, α). Condition 3 is not satisﬁed since S1∗ contains a unique element.
Consider now a path such as ((c, α), (c, α)).
Player 2’s total payoﬀ is 2, and a deviation of player 2 generates a sunk cost
of 1. Thus S1∗ = {(a, β); (b, γ)}. Given that there is no subsequent play, all
admissible paths are almost equivalent paths.
G∗ is the game



β

a
(1, 5)
b  (0, 0)
c
(0, 0)

γ


(1, 5)
(1, 3) 
(0, 0)

Using iterated elimination of weakly dominated moves in G∗ results in the
singleton (a, β) independent of the order of elimination. Accordingly G∗ is not
ambiguous and neither is S1∗ . Condition 3 is not satisﬁed.
Consider the path ((b, γ), (b, γ)).
Observe that a deviation of player 1 from b to a does not generate a sunk cost,
as such it cannot be used as an argument to invalidate such a path. However,
a deviation from b to c can be used and indeed invalidates this path.
The reader will check that ((b, γ), (c, α)) does satisfy the three conditions of
forward induction.

3

A Repeated Game of Entry

3.1

The Game G

A simple economic model is used which depends only on two parameters F
and ω, the ﬁrm’s strategic variables being the (nonnegative) prices p and q,
respectively.
The parameter F refers to a ﬁxed cost (F > 0) which is incurred only in
case of strictly positive production (there is zero marginal cost). The cross
elasticities of the demand functions depend on ω.
Deﬁne the functions ddi and dm
i as
dd1 (p, q) = 1 + ω(q − p) − p;

dm
1 (p) = (1 + 2ω)(1 − p)/(1 + ω);

dd2 (p, q) = 1 + ω(p − q) − q

dm
2 (q) = (1 + 2ω)(1 − q)/(1 + ω)
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Table 1: Payoﬀs x102 with F = 0.35
q
0.373 0.329 0.311 0.262
p
-11.6 1.6
5.9
1.7
3.373 -11.6 -28
0
0
-28
-12.9 -8
1.7
0.329 1.6
-12.9 -18.8 0
0
-18.8 -13.6 -2.8
0.311 5.9
-8
-13.6 -28.8
0
0
-28.8 -15.7
0.262 1.7
1.7
-2.8
-15.7
0
0
0
-20.4
0.242 0
0
0
-12.3
0
0
0
0
0.188 -5.9
-5.9
-5.9
-5.9

and ω = 10
0.242 0.188
0
0
0
0
0
0
-12.3
-20.4
-16.7
-16.7
-29.7
-9.6

-5.9
0
-5.9
0
-5.9
0
-5.9
0
-9.6
-29.7
-21.2
-21.2

The ﬁrms are required to meet demands at the prices they set, and these
demands are given by dd1 and dd2 when both are nonnegative, by dm
i when it
is nonnegative and ddj is negative, and by 0 when dd1 and dd2 are both negative
m
d
or when ddi and dm
j are both negative. Clearly, di and di are identical when
d
dj (p, q) = 0. For a given price of its competitor each ﬁrm faces a continuous
but kinked demand curve, the higher the value of ω the stronger the kink.
Observe that the unconstrained monopoly price is 0.5 and that the corresponding proﬁt is bounded by 0.5.
Now the respective values of F and ω may be adjusted so that only one ﬁrm
may make some positive proﬁt at a time. More precisely, and for reasons to be
detailed later on, two inequalities are assumed to hold:
ω(1 + 2ω)(2 + 3ω)/(2 + 4ω + ω 2 )2 ≤ F ≤ (1 + 2ω)/4(1 + ω)
Note that the higher the value of ω the less stringent the inequalities. Table
I gives a numerical example with F = 0.35 and ω = 10.
This game may be interpreted as follows: each ﬁrm submits a price then the
demand eventually splits or goes to only one ﬁrm, and ﬁnally any ﬁrm which is
allocated a strictly positive demand must produce at a ﬁxed cost F .
Now if one thinks of the economic situation as being repeated, it is intuitive
that the level of the incumbent price imposes a constraint on the potential
entrant. This constraint takes the form of a sunk cost computed as the ﬁxed
cost F minus the revenue. The lower the incumbent price the lower this revenue
and the higher the sunk cost. If entry is proﬁt motivated and rational this sunk
cost must be compensated by future proﬁts. These proﬁts can only be obtained
through operating in the market later.
Then, if one accepts the idea of forward induction, the questions to solve are
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the following ones:
• Given a price for the incumbent, what makes the potential entrant moves
not ambiguous?
• Are there acceptable levels of prices for the incumbent so that entry is
deterred because of ambiguity of all possible moves by the potential entrant?
• If there are, what is the impact of the length of the game?
• Can the ﬁrms share the market and achieve some Pareto optimal payoﬀ
vector or is that kind of tacit collusion in contradiction with the idea of
self-enforceability associated with forward induction?
The claim of this paper is that forward induction is enough to obtain average
cost pricing as the unique outcome as the horizon goes to inﬁnity.

3.2

The Game G1

The following notation is adopted. Deﬁne the functions q d (·) and q c (·) as
dd2 (p, q d (p)) = 0;

dd1 (p, q c (p)) = 0

Deﬁne pd (·) and pc (·) in a similar fashion. Let π m (·) be the monopolist proﬁt
function
π m (p)

= π1 (p, q d (p))
= (1 + 2ω)p(1 − p)/(1 + ω) − F (and similarly for π m (q)).

Average cost pricing is deﬁned by pl or q l such that
π m (pl ) = π m (q l ) = 0

with pl and q l ∈ [0, 1/2]

This notation should be easy to keep in mind if one remembers the following.
The two ﬁrms cannot both be in the market and make positive proﬁts. Suppose
that at each stage there is an incumbent and a potential entrant. Let ﬁrm 1 be
the incumbent and ﬁrm 2 be the entrant:
pa stands for a potentially “acceptable” price for ﬁrm 1,
q d stands for a (high) price for ﬁrm 2 at which it “drops” from the market.
More precisely, it is the lowest price at which it will sell zero. Thus it is
obtained through dd2 (pa , q d (pa )) = 0;
q c stands for a price for ﬁrm 2 at which it defects from q d and “calls” the
price pa , in other words it sets a low price, enters given pa , and generates
a sunk cost relative to q d ; more precisely q c is such that this sunk cost
is the lowest one, and it is obtained through dd1 (pa , q c (pa )) = 0 (using the
best response curve and standard calculus this statement is equivalent to
the assumption F ≥ ω(1 + 2ω)(2 + 3ω)/(2 + 4ω + ω 2 )2 );
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q

1
dd2(p,q)
qd(pa)

dd1(p,q)

qc(pa)
1/(1+ω)

1/(1+ω)

pa

1

p

Figure 1: A potentially acceptable price pa and the associated dropping price q d (pa )
and calling price q c (pa ).

pl stands for average cost pricing ; it is the limit to which pa is claimed
to converge as n goes to inﬁnity (the existence of pl is obtained by the
assumption F ≤ (1 + 2ω)/4(1 + ω)).
Going back to the numerical example, one gets : if pa = 0.262 then q d =
0.329 and q c = 0.188. As for pl = q l , it is 0.242. Figure 1 gives a graphical
representation.
Using this notation, one may express the set of pure Nash equilibria in G1
as two symmetric line segments {(pa , q d (pa ))} and {(pd (q a ), q a )} such that
(i) pl ≤ pa ≤ p11 and q l = q c (p11 ) ;
(ii) q l ≤ q a ≤ q11 and pl = pc (q11 ).
(For simplicity it is assumed that p11 and q11 are less than 0.5; otherwise the
upperbound of pa and q a is 0.5).
In other words, only one ﬁrm operates and may generate some proﬁt. The
potential entrant equilibrium price is not indeterminate; it must deter further
price increase on the part of the incumbent. The two symmetric line segments
are depicted Fig. 2.
Although an analysis using best response curves may be used to obtain this
result, the following argument may also be satisfactory. Take a point such as
(pl , q11 ). This is an equilibrium as long as (i) q c (pl ) involves a positive sunk cost,
which is true since otherwise pl could not possibly be average cost pricing, and
(ii) pl is a best response to q11 , which is true since by deﬁnition pl = pc (q11 ), thus
pl generates the lowest sunk cost relative to q11 (in that case it does not generate
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q

1

ql 1
ql

pl

pl1

1

p

Figure 2: The equilibria of G1 .

any). Now, this reasoning can be extended as long as q c (pa ) ≤ q11 .
The set of equilibria S1 of G1 has a lot of singularities. These singularities
explain the power of Conditions 1-3. Observe in particular that :
(i) S1 can be divided into two families {(pa , q d (pa ))} and {(pd (q a ), q a )} and
this partition is equivalent to saying which ﬁrm may eventually make some
proﬁt;
(ii) when ﬁrm 1 (and similarly ﬁrm 2) is restricted to prices in [p, p11 ] with pl ≤
p < p11 , the associated restricted game G∗ is not ambiguous ; iterated elimination
of weakly dominated moves results in the unique equilibrium outcome in which
entry is most proﬁtable for ﬁrm 1;
(iii) for any (pa , q d (pa )) and for any ε > 0, there exists pc = pa such that
c1 (pa , pc ) < ε (and similarly for any (pd (q a ), q a )) that is, the incumbent can
incur a sunk cost which may be as small as possible ;
(iv) for any (pd (q a ), q a ) with q a = q11 , there exists ε > 0 such that ∀pc =
d a
p (q ), c1 (pd (q a ), pc ) > ε (and similarly for any (pa , q d (pa )) with pa = p11 ), that
is, the entrant cannot incur an arbitrarily small sunk cost.

3.3

The Game G2

The game G2 is now studied using the formalization of forward induction given
in Section 2.
Lemma 1. In G2 the ﬁrms cannot alternate on the market.
Proof: Suppose it is the case that ﬁrm 1 is in the market and then ﬁrm 2.
Since ﬁrm 1 is not in the market at the second stage it must be that it is in with
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a nonnegative proﬁt at the ﬁrst stage ; otherwise the corresponding path would
not be perfect. If it is in a position to make some proﬁt it can incur a sunk cost
arbitrarily small. The set of paths in G1 that compensate this loss is a subset
of {(pa , q d (pa ))}. In the associated restriction G∗ of G, ﬁrm 1 is restricted to
p ∈]pl , p11 ]. By construction ﬁrm 2 will never make any proﬁt ; its moves are
all weakly dominated by q d (p11 ). G∗ can then be reduced to a singleton and so
is not ambiguous. The subset of paths to which ﬁrm 1 is restricted in G1 is
not ambiguous so that the path under consideration in G2 , in which the ﬁrms
alternate, violates condition 3.
Lemma 2. S2 is such that either p1 = p11 or q1 = q11 .
This lemma means that the incumbent, whichever it is, has to select its
most favorable sub-equilibrium at the last stage. The proof is omitted since it
essentially amounts to repetition of the argument of Lemma 1.
To characterize S2 it is enough to give the range of acceptable prices for the
incumbent at the initial stage. Assume ﬁrm 1 is the incumbent and now deﬁne
p22 such that
π m (q c (p22 )) + π m (q11 ) = 0;
assume for the time being that pl ≤ p22 ≤ p11 . (For the numerical example
F = 0.35, ω = 10, since π m (q11 ) = 0.059 it can be computed that q c (p22 ) = 0.188
and p22 = 0.262).
For any choice of p2 at the initial stage which is lower than p22 , the minimal
sunk cost that ﬁrm 2 can incur is −π m (q c (p2 )) > −π m (q c (p22 )). It cannot be
compensated at the last stage since π m (p11 ) represents the highest value in terms
of Nash equilibrium. On the contrary, if p2 > p22 , there is a sunk cost that can
be associated with a subset of {(pd (q a ), q a )} which is not ambiguous. This leads
to a full characterization of S2 . Like S1 it consists of two symmetric families of
paths:
(P2a , Qd2 ) = ((pa2 , q2d (pa2 )), (p11 , q d (p11 ))
(P2d , Qa2 ) = ((pd2 (q2a ), q2a ), (pd (q11 ), q11 ))
in which
pl ≤ pa2 ≤ p22
with
π m (q c (p22 )) + π m (q11 ) = 0
and
q l ≤ q2a ≤ q22
with
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π m (pc (q22 )) + π m (p11 ) = 0
The structure of S2 is such that it can again be divided into two families.
Furthermore within one family all paths are identical except at the initial stage.
This singularity shows that Condition 3 of Section 2 can be very powerful in the
context of these games whereas, as it stands, one would not expect much of it.
Formally, the study of the game repeated three times is identical to the study
of the game repeated twice. And so on.

3.4

The Repeated Game Gn

At this point what remains to be proved is that pl ≤ p22 ≤ p11 and more generally
that this remains true as the game is repeated.
This condition will ensure that it is in the short term best interest of the
incumbent to deter entry. Otherwise Sn may not exist for n ≥ 2. This condition
is always satisﬁed as long as the two inequalities on F and ω hold.
The following simple notation is adopted (to simplify the notation further
the incumbent is arbitrarily assumed to be ﬁrm 1) :
π(·) = π m (·)
Deﬁne p1 by
p1 = p11 = pL
Recall that
pL = (1 + ωpl )/(1 + ω)
so that pl < p1 . Observe also that π(q c (p1 )) = π(q c (pL )) = 0. For n ≥ 2, deﬁne
pn by
π(pj ) = 0
π(q c (pn )) + Σj=n−1
j=1
Theorem 1. The sequence (pn ) is nonincreasing and converges to pl such that
π(pl ) = 0
Lemma 3. The function p → π(q c (p)) − π(p) is nondecreasing when p belongs
to [pl , pL ].
Proof: By deﬁnition
π(q c ) = (1 + 2ω)(1 − q c )q c /(1 + ω) − F
But q c (p) = p − (1 − p)/ω. Then π(q c (p)) = (1 + 2ω)(1 − p)(1 + 1/ω)(p − (1 −
p)/ω)/(1 + ω) − F so that π(q c (p)) − π(p) = (1 + 2ω)2 (1 − p)(p − (1 + ω)/(1 +
2ω))/ω 2 (1 + ω), which is increasing for p ≤ (2 + 3ω)/2(1 + 2ω).
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The interesting range for p is [pl , pL ] and so it must be shown that pL ≤
(2 + 3ω)/2(1 + 2ω). By deﬁnition
pl = pL − (1 − pL )/ω
whereas pl is such that
(1 + 2ω)(1 − pl )pl /(1 + ω) = F
then pL satisﬁes
(1 + 2ω)(pL (1 + ω) − 1)(1 − pL )/ω 2 = F
Since pL is the smaller of the two roots of this equation and since the average
of the two roots is (2 + ω)/2(1 + ω) ≤ (2 + 3ω)/2(1 + 2ω), this concludes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 1: This will be done by induction.
(i) Step 1: p2 ≥ pl . By deﬁnition
π(q c (p2 )) + π(pL ) = 0
so that
π(q c (p2 )) − π(pl ) = π(q c (pL )) − π(pL )
Since π(q c (p)) is increasing in p, p2 ≥ pl is equivalent to
π(q c (pl )) − π(pl ) ≤ π(q c (pL )) − π(pL )
But pl < pL holds so that using Lemma 3 this inequality holds.
(ii) Step n: if pn−1 ≥ pl then pn ≥ pl . By deﬁnition
π(q c (pn )) + Σj=n−1
π(pj ) = 0
j=1
But
π(q c (pn−1 )) + Σj=n−2
π(pj ) = 0
j=1
so that
π(q c (pn )) − π(pl ) = π(q c (pn−1 )) − π(pn−1 )
and pn ≥ pl is equivalent to
π(q c (pl )) − π(pl ) ≤ π(q c (pn−1 )) − π(pn−1 )
which is true since pn−1 ≥ pl is assumed to hold.
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(iii) Monotonicity of pn : Note that
π(q c (pn )) − π(q c (pn−1 )) + π(pn−1 ) = 0;
since pn−1 ≥ pl , π(pn−1 ) ≥ 0 then π(q c (pn )) ≤ π(q c (pn−1 )) which gives
pn ≤ pn−1 . This completes the induction argument.
(iv) (pn ) converges to pl : Since (pn ) is a non increasing sequence bounded
by pl it converges to some limit, and so does π(pn ) and π(q c (pn )) =
π(pj ) since q c (p) is continuous. This implies that the limit of π(pn )
−Σn−1
1
is zero as n goes to inﬁnity ; otherwise a contradiction would arise since
by construction for any n, π(pn ) ≥ 0. The limit of pn is pl .

Then π(q c (pn )) converges to π(q c (pl )), the negative value of which might
be interpreted as the total cumulated proﬁt that the incumbent could obtain
under this solution concept ; −π(q c (pl )) is referred to as the monopoly rent
under forward induction.
Theorem 2. The set of pure paths SN that satisfy the conditions of forward
induction is not empty and consists of two symmetric families. The family for
which ﬁrm 1 is the incumbent is
(PNa , QdN ) = ((paN , q d (paN )), (pN −1 , q d (pN −1 )), . . . , (p1 , q d (p1 )))
in which
pl ≤ paN ≤ pN ,
where pn for n = 1 to N is deﬁned according to Theorem 1.
Proof: Observe that the structure of Sn−1 consists of two families of paths
which, within each family, only diﬀer at the initial stage. Observe also that the
incumbent remains the same in any path of Sn−1 . Assume now that the ﬁrms
alternate in Gn , namely that ﬁrm 1 enters ﬁrst and then ﬁrm 2 remains on the
market until the end (otherwise Condition 2 would be violated). Firm 1 can
incur a sunk cost arbitrarily small that can only be compensated by paths in
Sn−1 in which ﬁrm 1 will be the incumbent until the end, since it has already
been proved that there is no path in Gn−1 in which the two ﬁrms would alter∗
which compensate ﬁrm 1 are identical from
nate. Moreover all the paths in Sn−1
∗
is or
stage n − 2 until the end. Deﬁnition 4 can be used to see whether Sn−1
is not ambiguous. At this point the proof is exactly the same as in Section 3.3.
For this game, this shows that in the long run forward induction and sunk
costs give average cost pricing.
Recall that the set of perfect equilibria to this game as n goes to inﬁnity is
the set of all individually rational payoﬀs (Benoit and Krishna, 1985).

Ponssard

Interpretation of the Results

14

As for renegotiation proofness, a procedure such as the one described in
Moreaux et al. (1987) can be used to obtain the same result. This procedure relies on the existence of three equilibria (p1 , q 1 ), (p2 , q 2 )(p3 , q 3 ) in the constituent
game G such that
π1 (p3 , q 3 ) < π1 (p2 , q 2 ) < π1 (p1 , q 1 )
π2 (p1 , q 1 ) < π2 (p2 , q 2 ) < π2 (p3 , q 3 )
The existence of equilibria in G which satisﬁes these constraints is clear.
Corollary. The monopoly rent under forward induction goes to zero as ω goes
to inﬁnity.
Proof:
−π(q c (pl )) = F − (1 + 2ω)(1 − pl )(pl − (1 − pl )/ω)/(1 + ω)
But (1 + 2ω)(1 − pl )pl /(1 + ω) = F so that −π(q c (pl )) = (1 + 2ω)(1 − pl )2 /ω(1 +
ω) ≤ 2/ω.
Roughly speaking forward induction makes constestability rather robust as
opposed to previous results (Farrell, 1986).

4

Interpretation of the Results

From an economic standpoint the results suggest that prior to entering a market
a potential competitor goes into a calculation in which it balances the costs of
entering with the potential beneﬁts of being the new incumbent. The novelty
of the calculation comes from the tact that to compute the beneﬁts it takes into
account the constraint that it will be subject to further potential competition
based on the same argument, but one step further. This interpretation exhibits
the circular nature of forward induction. Yet this argument is not a vicious
circle when the game is assumed to be ﬁnite or discounted (for an analysis of
the discounted game see Ponssard, 1990b).
Under this interpretation the existence of barriers to entry is not directly
related to the existence of ﬁxed costs or sunk costs in the usual sense (Baumol,
1982), but to the tact that the ﬁrms can or cannot commit themselves on the
economic calculations that may or may not be carried out. If the ﬁrms can
commit themselves on the kind of economic calculations that are associated
with this formalization of forward induction then the existence of sunk costs is
not a barrier to entry provided the time horizon is long enough. This generates
a new framework for other economic applications related to limit pricing.
¿From a game theoretic standpoint it may be worth mentioning that this
approach to forward induction assumes common knowledge of rationality at
every node of the game tree (Gilboa, 1989). The two players’ behaviors are
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intertwined by the common knowledge assumption and this is the key element
to self-enforceability.
However, there seems to be a paradox here. Why would the players commit
themselves to rules that seem rational but not go further in their commitment
for there mutual beneﬁt, i.e., directly commit on a Pareto optimal outcome? A
possible answer is that further commitment might inhibit the “creative destruction” of a valid signal. The players commit on rules because of their general
properties in a given context and not on a particular outcome because the exact
game to be played is never completely known. This interpretation confers an
economic touch to forward induction which may explain its elusive character.
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